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Being and Thought: 
The Beginnings of 
Wissenschaft { slehre} in 
Ficfite and Hegel (1812) 
MICHAEL G. VATER 
Hegel finished the preface to the first olume of hi Science of Logic on 
Mar h 22, 1812 and gave it the subtitl "Obj ctive Logic: the Doc­
trine of Being." 1 In September of the sam y ar Fi hte started to lec­
ture on th relation between I gic and phi l sophy under the tille 
Transcendental Logic.2 Both thinkers hay R "inh Id and Bardil i 's uri­
ous dualism in mind when they c:omment on th iniLial procedure 
and the result of logic, b u t there is no reason to th ink they had each 
other in view.3 A comparative reading of the two texts i still enlight­
ening, sin e it discovers with in the comm n sta11c of idealism differ nt 
views about the relation of thought and its obje l, about the starting­
point of philosophical r flection, and whether thought arrives al full 
determinacy or concretene in its result. 
Fichte's conception of thought's fun tion and competence confine 
h is philosophy to the stand point of fonnal idealism, or a heory of knowl­
edge that is me taphy icall neutral ( or skeptical), and in fact invites 
religious or th logi ·al completion. H g I' view of thought dctin 
the standpoin t of objective idealism, where logic merges with metaphysics 
and philosoph claim in and as a process of thinking not only to analyz 
reality, but to define it. Despite Hegel's sugg stion that philosophy's 
practi e app roximates the noesi noeuiJ of Aristotle's fir t mover. he 
uses th melhodological stanc of idealism to avoid making ontologi­
cal commitments, and so ends in metaphysical skepticism. I h JI ar-
ue that each thinker ends with a postmetaphysical view that stresses th 
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limitations of.human cognition, though perhaps not in a ful1y straight­
forward way, since each (consciously or unconsciously) conceals the 
modesty of the human dwelling behind ari ornamental facade of theo­
logical and metaphysical language, the function of which is not cogni­
tive, but edifying. 
These are abrupt claims that can be substantiated only by a more 
detailed analysis of the two Logics. Since they contradict surface 
understandings of Fichte and Hegel which are current, and which may 
have been suggested by these authors themselves, I shall first ask how 
the two systems sketched in 1812 stand as epistemologies and meta­
physics. Then I shall explore the terms of the being-lhoughi relation, 
considering each first for Fichte, then for Hegel. Since each philoso­
pher's theory is dauntingly complex, these expositions will be presented 
under separate headings, and comparisons also. 
INITIAL CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE 1812 LOGICS 
Fichte in 1812 seems to be much like the Kant he criticized as a dog­
matist in 1794 and 1797, confining philosophy to the investigation of 
the structures of consciousness, but talking nonetheless of an in-itself 
or transcendent ground for knowledge and action. Wissenschaftslehre is 
competent onl)' to explain the facts of consciousness, yet its construc­
tion of empirical consciousness-derived from the supposedly univer­
sal complementarity of image and formal being-is framed by talk of 
being as such, independent, self-determining, conceived outside all , 
relation, negation, or relativity (Cp. TL 171 and 202-03). Though God 
or Being cannot enter his philosophy proper, which is a genetic ac­
count of appearances, and so explains solely from that being which is 
correlated with image ( TL 316), Fichte nonetheless avers that the be­
ing of appearances lies in God (TL 286). A philosophy of limited scope, 
purporting only to explain the being-image complementarity in con­
sciousness (and not in God), opens itself to theological or metaphysi~ 
cal supplement. 
Hegel's self-developing system of thought-determinations, on the other 
hand, remains a consistently transcendental venture-theory elaborated 
to explain the possibility of meaningful cognition in all realms of hu­
man experience. If Fichte's thought lead him back to traditional meta­
physical (eventually skeptical) questions about the relationship betwee n 
what is and what consciousness furnishes as experience, Hegel works within 
an intra-experiential domain where the metaphysical question of over­
lap between cognition and being cannot easily be asked or cogently 
answered. Fichte's later philosophy disjoins being and thinking in order 
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to think solely about thinking, yet h also continues to talk of a 
nontemporal, nonexpc riential domain that is the ultimate ground o f 
empirical selfhood . Hegel eschews all talk of ontological anchoring; 
incorporating being as the first thought inside the philosophical deity's 
noesis noeseos, he thinks being under the rubric of "proc ess" inside the 
process that is thinking. One philosophy justifies itself by invoking an 
outside ground that philosophy itself cannot inspect, the other hy bending 
thought into the se rpentine shape of self-reference. 
If one brackets Fichte 's extra-philosophicaJ appeal to a foundation 
and ground, he limits the scope of philosophical construction prope r 
out of a sense of modesty. Philosoph)' is explanation, a matter of assuming 
(on some evidence), constructing, deducing, shaping results, aJJ o f which 
is governed by the criteria of cohe rence and comprehensive ness. No 
proof of the congruence of the explanation with the exf1licandum can 
be give n; all explanation takes place inside their assumed congruence . 
This explicit cohere ntism makes the extra-systematic appeal to foundation 
even more puzzling. Like Kant before him, Fichte 's sense of logic and 
of the primacy of practice push him to transgress the very line he sets 
up to divide philosophy from nonphilosophy. 
In contrast to Fichte's, Hegel's vision of the scope and competence 
of philosophy is wider, born of the attempt to recapture the grandeur 
of ancient metaphysics. Yet his theory moves within a circle of unex­
plained assumptions and unasked questions.4 Its c riterion of explana­
tion is frankly coherentistic. The whole of logic thinks the tota lity of 
what is, without any privileged moment of certainty or fac tuality, just 
the way Quine argues that the whole of language mirrors reality, without 
any one-to-one anchoring of a finite expression in sone disc re te state 
of affairs. In his 1827 Lectures on the History of Modem Philosophy. Schelling 
se es and clearly states that Hegel 's (and his own earlier) philosophy 
either left metaphysical question unasked or assumed without anti­
skeptical comment the tradition 's monolithic presupposition about the 
congruence of being and thinking. The idealist merely thinks about 
thinking-a process which for lhe later Schelling does n o l approach 
the self-reflection of the Aristotelian deity, but just p e rforms the 
Leibnizean fraud of minting possibility as good coin. Sc helling rightly 
called this .. negative philosophy," an account of what might be the case .5 
1. BEING, THE C O UNTERPART O R START ING-PorNT 
OF THOUGHT? THOUGHT AND WHAT IS THOUGHT 
Both Fichte and Hegel share a basic stance in 1812. Philosophy is ide­
alism, a n affair of thought, and its object is itself. But eac h thinker 
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defines thought in an importantly different way. For Fichte, thought is 
a species of the basic expressive activ1ty of imaging a being. FoT Hegel, 
thought is sclf-devclopmenl, the process of determining its determinability 
or coming to concreteness. 
Fichte defines thinking by the polarity of image and object, or of 
positing and positedness: 
Thinking is a knowing, a further determination of knowing. In the 
Introduction we characterized knowing as a seeing of a being through an 
image; so thinking must also bear this general character of knowing ... 
Thinking is an imagi,ng that absolu.tely posits an image of itself. One 
image = a is not thinka_ble without a further image == b. In this 
situation, that it is nothing wiithout this positedness of the other, 
lies its essence. ( TL 124). 
All cognitive activities presuppose the polarity of activity and object: 
To an image corresponds an ima1!ed something ( TL 152) , to an intuition 
an image which is its object, to a thought an intuition which is its 
object. And as a general law of being, Fichte puts forth the proposition: 
Image corresponds to being ( TL 135), which he restates as: There is 
appearance, or: I perceive ( ich stelile vor).6 
There is little surprising in this framework supposition. It is directly 
shown in embodied consciousness, and the task of transcendental logic 
is to show the difference between the laws of thought as the framework 
for consciousness and the wooden "laws" of judgment and syllogism 
delivered by "common logic." Note, however. that Fichte deploys the 
complementarity of heing and positing-an-image as a general ontological 
framework, prior to the philosophical construction of the empirical I. 
It is the dynamic nature of the Bild, the expressed image or form, that 
lets Fichte explain the intuitive or "'seeing" nature of all knowing and 
ultimately too the way empirical consciousness shapes itself around a 
"self.'' He is not perfectly clear about the active nature of images and 
imaging in the 1812 text, but in the 1797 / 99 lVissenschaftslehre -nova 
methodo he criticizes the failure of all previous philosophies, even the 
Kantian, to grasp that consciousness is an "eye," a seeing of itself, a 
self-mirroring mirror, not just a medium in which an image is displayed. 
lmage or form is noljust reflection as reflected, but reflecting reflection.' 
Fichte is not wholly clear on the dynamic or expressive power of 
images in the 1812 text, but he at least tries to prevent any confusion 
between transcendental and empirical levels of analysis. The lawful 
conjunction of image and objec:::t is a necessary feature of being itself, 
while consciousness is derivative, i.e., it is an appearance whose factuality 
is intelligible because it follows from or falls under this law.8 In postu-
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lating a general polarity of being and activity/image, Fichte merges 
psychology and ontology. In doing so, he also urpasses the "picture 
theory" of Spinoza's psychology, where idea primarily is a prese ntaLion 
of or report upon ideatum, and only secondarily a report about itself 
as reflected reflection, awareness of awareness.9 For Fichte, being is in 
itself, thought or knowing is about itself. and the two are everywhere lo­
gethe,· because the lauer follows upon the former.10 
In Hegel's philosophy, thought is about itself in a more radical way, 
since there it has no "outside.'' It is its own content and supplies its 
own form or approach. Thought negates the simple formulae of under­
standing, says Hegel, but then, not remaining in the "not," it restores 
them to positivity as its universal and concre te conte nt: 
This intellectual (geistigel mot.ion that supplies [to thought] its 
detenninations in their simplicity and also their identity with it, 
which is thereby the immanent development of the Concept, is at 
once the absolute method of cognition and the indwelling soul of 
[its] contents too. (WLE7/ SL28). 
The centrality to being of thinking, or· the unsc para tedness of o n e 
from the other, was grasped by the ancient metaphysicians who 
understood the kinship of things and of thinking ( WLE 25-26/ SL 45). 
The poin t of philosophical learning (or education) is to recover this 
insight; the outcome of the Phenomenology of Spirit is the overcoming 
of the externality of separating reflection. In othe,- wo rds, what phi­
losophizing consciousness has to <lo to attain the standpoint of scie nce 
o r pure thinking is to surpass/ suppress the e rroneous stance of subjec• 
tivity, its rootedness in empirical consciousness or the oppositional mode 
of conceiving things. 
Science is the very antithesis of subjectivity, Hegel claims, or the 
separation and re fining of a broader integrating "self," one rliffc rent 
from the agent in appearances which ceaselessly posits and opposes 
subject and object. Hegel says emphatically. 
Pure science presupposes liberation from the oppositions of con­
sciousness. Il embraces thought in so Jar as it is also the essential 
content or the essential content in so Jar as it is pure thought. As science 
truth is pure self.developing self-consciousness and has the shape 
of a seJf, so that substance and truth ( das an und Jt'ir sich Seiende) is 
the known Concept and the Concept is that which is substance and truth 
( WLE 30-31/ SL 49) . 
Pure thought or Concept is self-as-such, self prior to the oppositional 
burden of empirical consciousness. It is radically independent and about 
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itself. Like Spinoza's idea, 1t 1s an active thinking, an expression of 
cognitive power in its own right; rnnlike Spinoza's idea, it is not essentially 
defined in terms of a preexisting ideatu.m or object. 
We may contrast the positions of Fichte and Hegel in this way: Fichte 
assimilates thinking to representation or imaging, to the expression of 
being as object. lt is not alway:s clear in the 1812 lectures that the 
originally imaged object is determinability or objectivity in general rather 
than a pre-given determinate object. Hegel, for his p~rt, conceives 
thinking as a process of delermining the determinable, or of bringing 
itself simultaneously to greater universality and individuality. He makes 
imaging-object consciousnes.s or mental operations by way of 
Vorstellungen, of both cogriitive and appetitive sorts-into a fallen and 
parasitic type of thinking. 11 
For both Fichte and for Hegd, therefore, what is originally there 
for thought to think is something dense, packed, tomplicate,d, something 
that comes on the scene as already a synthesis or relation. But, as Hegel 
reminds us, if pbilosophy has to begin somewhere, its starting point is 
just a starting point, not a first principle { WL 51/ SL 67), and so it is 
something simple, obvious, aud given: a first synthesis, an archetypal 
relation. 
Being in Fichte: image and Object 
Fichte's starting-point is thinking itse]f, doubly defined as imaging and 
knowing. As image, thought posits an image of itself, and as a species 
of knowing, it is the viewing of a being through an image ( TL 124). 
There arc three items to note and distinguish in this complicated first 
move: the image itself, the awareness of the image, and the opposition 
between image and what is expressed within the image. (l) The image: 
Fichte makes all cognition-knowledge in general. "seeing," imaging, 
intuition, thinking-a matter of dynamic mediation by images. All 
knowing involves a "formal ima:ge," and this image includes a reality 
that can only be described as "formal hcing."12 (2) The aware ness carried 
with the image: A reflexive moment, an awareness that one is aware, 
an image of an image, is built into the primary activity of seeing, imaging, 
and so fortbY (3) The image and imaged polarity: The identity and 
difference of image aud what is imaged1 which steps forth into awareness 
in the very imaging, is what is important for further philosophical analysis 
(since the formality of the repn~sentational approach closes off other 
avenues of philosophical queslioning). One gets to the conviction that 
knowing is anchored in being in some sense, or that image-awareness 
is awareness of something beyond the image, only through the 
presentation of this polarity in llhe consciousness of Lhe image. 
Fichte brings these three elements together in the following sum-
mary text: 
Seeing [or knowing] in general is absolute image-being tabsolu.tes 
BildseinJ . • .. An image posits an i,maged, as surely as it is. Now it 
also pertains to seeing that this illllage, just as surely as it is, un­
derstand itself as image, and only thereby, in and through the 
contrast, understand what is imaged; not image, but being. Only 
this pertains to seeing in general. 
Differences in the seeing stem from the inner nature of the 
absolutely real l.\'eimdes) image; what follows from this inner formal 
being ( of the image] becomes it.~1 imaged counterpart ( TL 392) . 
The text goes on to elaborate two possibilities for the imaged counter­
part: If it is dead, finished, ready at hand, and lifeless, it is the Jactiral 
image, the domain of empirical reality. If it living, activity, and a facility 
for itself producing images, it is thinking, the vision which has eyes for 
only the law, not for the facts. When the two are brought together, 
factical intuition and intellectual thought, philosophy or Wissenschafts/,ehre 
can comprehend appearance by producing the factical image from its 
grounds, genetically deriving it flrom its law. Appe arance is then 
comprehende d as at once an image of itself and an image of its 
counterpart, the being which is beyond all appearing ( TL 393). 
lt is difficult to assess this complicated starting-point as a program 
for transcendental philosophy in general, and even more difficult lo 
follow the analytic resolution (whic:h Fichte calls a "genesis") of this 
initial knot of image-being in to all its discrete moments. Fichte's talk 
of image, image-being, images of images, formal being, and of an 
ultimately incongruent relation of complementarity betwee n appear­
ance and reality is metaphysical, no1t psychological language. He is not 
doing phenome nology, if phenomenology is the analysis of structures 
of subjectivity that takes the subjec t as the underlying ground of the 
giveness of what appears. The whole force of Fichte's analysis is to 
make the e mpirical subject even more evanescent and impermanent 
than the realm of appearances, to make the empirical self but one 
item in a stream of appearings. Bu1 if Fichte does not wish to 
substantialize the subject, neither dloes he wish to ascribe any endur­
ing reality status to the flow of images which occur out of, about, and 
on the perimeter of being. Images, which are about themselves (and 
thus eventually incubate subjects) and about being, cannot be called 
to philosophical account-at least in that second aspect where they 
are said to be about that which in principle escapes them: viz. , p e rma­
nent, self~ nclosed being. They can, ouce given or presupposed, be 
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mustered and marshaled to explain the factual exis.tence of the em­
pirical self and its world, but they cannot be derived from any ground 
of being. Only factical consciousness can be explained in its factidty. 
Says Fichte, 
The empirical is indeed comprehensible in its existence, but not 
at all in its determinacy. This incomprehensibility, hence abso­
luteness for the intellect { Verstand}, is that which ever has and ever 
will tempt us to take it for absolute being, which has occasioned 
all dogmatism and nature-philosophy among us (TL 314). 
Being in Hegel: Tho11,ght's. Beginning 
If Fichte's starting-point is the relation between image and imaged­
object given in thinking, whose density includes an element of self­
giveness, and so of added complexity, Hegel's point of departure is 
equally dense, although it gives itself out as the simplest and the most 
obvious o~ject for thought. 
The situation is more complicated than I have just described it: Hegel's 
beginning, the immediate category of being, is both dense and ~imple. 14 
It is simple, or apparently simp)e, because thought must begin as 
Parmenides did from the judgment: It is and cannot not be. Says Hegel, 
The beginning must be absolute, or what is the same in this context, 
it must be abstract. It should presuppose nothing, be mediated by 
nothing, nor have a ground, since it is rather to he the ground 
for the whole of philosophic science .... The beginning is there­
fore pitre being ( WLE 54/ SL 70). · 
But being is complicated as well. Taken outside the artificial disjunc­
tion of the Parmenidean dilemma, being can be thought only as the 
abstract counterpart (and extensional equivalent) of nothing, and so 
only as a moment artificially isolated from the oscillation back and 
forth that goes on in becoming or process. Hegel expresses the complicated 
situation with great care and brevity: 
Pure being and pure nothing are th•us the same. What the truth is, is 
neither being nor nothing, but the fact that being goes over into 
nothing, and nothing into being-or does not goes over but has 
[already] gone over. But neither is the truth that they arc undi­
vided from each other. They are not the same, they are absolutely 
distinguished, but are just the same undivided and indivisible; each 
immediate(v disappears into its oj1posite counterpart. Their truth is thus 
the motion of their immediate disappearance into each other: process 
( WLE 67 / SL 82-83). 
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HegeJ's immediat or implest category is a ailab.le only in vanishing 
form, as an analy and from a complicated relational situation that is 
t o chaotic or unstable really ev n to de rv the nam synthesis. It is 
the classic intellectual as of Heisenb rgian indeterminac ; one need 
only think being to put it in motion, in fact to make it disappear. 
To make matter. worse, not only is Heg l's beginning materially 
polyvalent (because it is conceptually botb d nse and simple), the formal 
requirement that thought tart its cone ptual and abstra t thinking 
with the simplest and most immediate is iLSelf the complicaced outcom 
of a previous investigation, The Phenomenology of Spirit, whose precarious 
and uncertain subjectivity, once complet d falls back upon itself and 
becomes the simplest. most immediate th ught of the simplest, immediate 
object. Hegel xplains the formal po i tion of the knower in th Logic 
as follows: 
In that work [the Phenomenology] immediate consciou ncs is whac 
is first and imm diate in the science, and thus its presupposition. 
But in the Logic the presupposition is that which proved iLc;;elf to 
be the resul of the earlier con ideration-the Idea of pure know­
ing, Logi,c is pure science, that is, pure knowing in the total ambit of 
its d elopm nt. In the earlier result this Idea defined itself as 
the certajn y which has b come truth. On the ne hand , it is no 
longer over against the object, hut has internalized it and knows 
it as itself. On the lher hand, knowing has given up b ing opposed 
to the object and being only the object's negation; it has divested 
itself of this [s rt of] subjectivity and is at one with itll dive titure 
( WLE 53/SL 69) . 
On the formal side, then, the knower in the initial phase of che l,ogi.r 
is ne who has surrend red he st.a.nee of subjectivity (which includes 
point of view, depende nc on prcjudi s and presuppositions, and 
uncertainty). She has gone ov r to the simplicity of absolute knowing 
or int llecmal in tuilion, as the collapse of the richnes and contracHc­
tion of her own exp riential ascent to it. 15 
Both from the formal and the material ide then, or considered in 
terms of the quality of thinking and the quality of the object thought, 
HegeJ's beginning is a simplicity dense with surmounted and yet to b 
unfolded omplexity. It has implicitly. again b th on the material and 
I.he formal sides, the relational structures-transitive, reflective, and 
organically elf-r fer ntial-that chara terize the unfolding of the Logic 
as a whole. 
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2. THOUGHT: EMPTY FORMALITY OR SELF-
SPECIFICATION? FICHTE AND HEGEL: THE DIFFERENCE 
We have seen that Hegel and Fichte make comparable initial moves in 
their 1812 Logi,cs, especially with respect to the category of being. Both 
define metaphysical or transcendental logic as the project of thought 
considering itself, and both begin with an analysis of an item that is 
both an initial object (or immediate situation) and a principle for further 
reflection. For Fichte. the beginning is positing a general polarity of 
being and expression or image, for Hegel, the barest concept, being, 
as involved in the first concrete object of thought, p rocess. For both 
thinkers, being stands apart from the process of its elaboration. For 
Fichte it is ineffable vis-a-vis the seeing that folJows upon it, while for 
Hegel it is sub-effahle, too laden with the positive (but unarticulated) 
character of universal determinability to be anything for thought, that 
universal power or activity whose heing is to distinguish. For both 
thinkers, too, the thought-process that is philosophy is an activity elicited 
by being. For Fichte, it is a schema or image of God, the translation 
of being into life, while for Hegel, the indeterminate positivity of what 
merely is occasions the first "No" of thought's difference and its first 
twining of positivity and negativity into the embrace of contradiction. 
For both thinkers, then, thought happens in, about, away from being. 
It elaborates in an "elsewhere" of its own invention the determinacy, 
super-determinacy, even sheer contradiction of what merely and 
absolutely is. 
The major difference that distinguishes the two philosophers in 1812 
is the question of the origin of determinacy, and of the agency that 
transforms determinability into determinateness. The issue is whether 
thought is empty, constrained only ,genera11y by rational laws and depen­
dent on sensibility or empirical constraints for its fu)l determination­
the Kantian model of our cognitive faculties, which Fichte follows-or 
whether, instead, thought contains the whole mechanism of its .self­
determinalion and is thus a fully independent and self-realizing process. 
We saw earlier Lhat in the malte1· of being, Fichte seemed to give a 
transcendent as well as a transcendental referent to the term-God 
on one hand, the being of images on the other-while Hegel conceived 
it as but a moment in thinking, 01· purely transcendentally. But when 
it comes to defining or fixing the place of thought, Fichte confines 
himself to the struclures of thinking that explain experiential conscious­
ness, while Hegel seems to locate thinking beyond the plane of 
experience's eventuating (which can only happen for a subject, an 
individual or social instance of Geist). As we shall see, there is some 
ambiguity to this "beyond.'' It can be read as the otherworld of dog­
matic metaphysics or (correctly) as the "elsewhere" of transcendental 
formality, embodied in, e .g., rules, laws, institutions, cognitive meth­
odologies, and yearning for the good. Hegel is dear in his contention 
tha t thought achieves ~oncreteness in an initially wholly abstract way, 
as the logical Concept that undergoes the process of becoming both 
substance and subject, or Idea. Hegel's Idea is subjecthood, but is nei­
ther a nor the support or enjoyer of experience. 
Before I explore this difference in greater detail, I wish to set aside 
two texts in Fichte's 1812 Logic that make him seem to be executing 
Hegel's philosophical program. In one, Fichte speaks as if he were 
proposing to do Hegelian logic, i.e., to display the necessary intertwin­
ing of the basic concepts of metaphysics as the self-referential life and 
work of the one Concept or thought moving them. He corrects himself, 
however, and says it makes no difference whether and how one derives 
the multitude of concepts: "We have earlier on complete ly r ejected 
this division of common logic. J t woul<l have concepts without a 
conceiving. This is a palpable absurdity'' (TL 332) . What transcendental 
logic does instead is to conceive conceiving, i .e., to comprehend thinking 
as established by the laws of the being of appearance, to explain it as 
the understanding of se nsible images delivered by intuition. There is 
no deduction of the categories, strictly speaking, in the J 812 Tmnszen.­
dentale Logik, and there are only three concepts-sensibility, pure thought, 
and space, mediating between the other two (TL 334). 
In another text, Fichte speaks of the concept (or thought) in terms 
that make it sound like Hegel's self-mediating Concept: 
All actual thinking is this synthetic unity, Lhus a syllogism. The re 
is no concept without judgment and syllogism ISchluss I, for the 
concept is only in a conceiving, hence in a judging, while all 
judgment proceeds under a law and is thus a concluding fro m 
the law, an application of it to the case at hand. Conversely there 
is no judgmen t without concept, for it [too] is a [mode or] 
conceiving or grasping, from which the concept gets its name. 
That the judgment is not without a drawing of a conclusion was 
asserted in the first proposition ( TL 330). 
The syllogistic structure of which he speaks he re is no t Conceptual in 
Hegel's sense; it is not the rational syllogism where every one of the 
three terms mediates be tween the other two as extremes. 16 It is in­
stead a garden-variety argument that subsumes a case under a law or 
principle . The empirical T is said to be a syllogism because it emerges 
from the subsumption of a factical intuition (sensibility and the images 
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depicted in it) under the intellectual intuition of a law. Conversely, 
the formal syllogism is said to be an analytic or formal reproduction, 
in discursive fashion, of the original unity of cognition ( TL 380). While 
Hegel thinks of the syllogistic nature of the Concept as its ability 
to unite universality and individuality, freedom and positedness (see 
WLZ 220-21 /SL 583), Fichte thinks in Kantian terms of the intellectual 
domain as the subsumption of individual images or intuitions under 
laws ( TL 319). 
I now return to the differences between Fichte's and Hegel's ideas 
of logic as a process of thought'~• sdf-reflection. For Fichte, although 
thought or expression is in its formal reality independent and self­
sufficing, a living and active translation of Being's (or God's) ineffable 
reality, on the side of content or it.s. concrete determination, the concept 
remains empty, a matter of pure formality, the mere ordering of sensible 
intuitions. For Hegel, on the other hand, thought is the power of the 
rational, self-specifying whole. It is not reflection or image, and its 
determinacy is not derived from a passive picturing of the determinacy 
of finite objects. It is more than the mere formal association of the 
materially dissociated, i.e., an indistinct reproduction of a multitude 
of distinct sensations. The Concept's determination-freed from the 
externality °' 11perficial connection seen in the categories of "Being" 
and from the futile attempts of ••Essence" to attain self-grounding in 
the Spinozistic mode (as substance, not as subject)-is a matter of its 
self-concretization, of its positing difference within itself as genus, and 
of its existence as concrete and universal in the individual ( WLZ 244-
48/ SL 604-08). . 
Fichte: Lat':fidness or Empty Generality 
Fichte remains the good Kantian, for whom concepts without intui­
tion are empty, and intuitions without concepts are blind. Thought or 
concept, as he indifferently ca11s it, is always connected to factical image, 
to intuition, to the image of determinate quality displayed in space or 
matter. Says Fichte, 
There is no pure thought, only an understanding. All thinking without 
exception is a synthesis of thought with some fact-positing intui­
tion. This is the fundamental law (which we should also universally 
convert, saying that there is a '.lso no intuition without thinking). 
This is what we have done here; we did not leave the thought­
image \Denkbild} of the image up in the air, but allowed it to be 
produced and engendered from ab [the complex of awareness and 
affect] ( TT., 277). 
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Thought and intuition, recall, are both kinds of images. Intuition has 
the dynamic structure of an image-expression of an image; thought is 
an image of intuition; mediating hetween the two is the concept of 
space, which makes possible the display of quality. In the philosophi­
cal thought-process that Fichte undertakes, everything that is ope n to 
analysis turns out to have this acti1ve and expressive image-structure. 
Converse ly, the only thing not open to analysis this way is original 
determination, which is variously saiid t.o he beyond any accounting, as 
a nonconstructible and incomprehensible q1.wle ( TL 300), or to be a 
direct determination by the absolute, as is mo rality.17 
What does thought (or concept) contribute to the structure of em­
pirical consciousness? It furnishes apperception, the unity of the factical 
image and the intellectual image of images ( TL 276); in this general 
capacity it is called intellect or Vers1iand. In m ore specific functions, it 
provides for sensibility (inner and iouter sense), for the lawfulness of 
appearance's location in space ( TL 335), for time or the reproduction 
of factual contents in the relation of before and after ( TL 342), and for 
the unity of the I on the subjective side and the community of beings 
on the objective side of perception ( TL 348, 351). Natural power and 
the products of nature-physical, m1echanical, chemical. and organic­
all emerge from the lawfulness of nature . Even the human person as 
body and soul, as a psyche that wills according to determinate Jaws, 
must be grasped as part of nature or the realm of un<lerstanding. "Of 
course," adds Fichte, "one has to foi·m a better concept of nature than 
as if it were some dead material. One must conceive it precisely a s a 
spiritual entity. Nature is a formal expression IBildl of absolute ap­
pearance; it is as surely as this is; ;and the pinnacle of nature is the 
human being, the expression of the :succession of absolute motion from 
the wiU" ( TL 362). 
In all these cases, however, Fichte attributes to thought nothing more 
than the imposition of lawfulness oc order upon a sensible determina­
tion that is factically intuited. Intellect is but. a mirror, the expressive 
organization of images determined e lsewhere-we know not how. Fichte's 
philosophy thus remains focused on and anchored in the empirical. 
All of its effort is directed toward tlhe redescription of empirical con­
sciousness, i.e., to the genetic deduction of its that, not its wherefor·e, 
toward furnishing the law of its fo,rmal being (or appearance), nol 
that of its reality or determination ( TL 313). The vehicle of philosophical 
lhought. inteJlectuaJ intuition, cmer1ges only as an<l in factical intuition 
of an empirical self, and only in inttuilion of factical determination is 
there a comprehension of a self ( TL 281). Philosophy is limited Lo the 
ilJumination of the empirical self. 
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He..~~l: Thought Thinkin.g Itself 
Hegel defines the Concept as the foundation and truth of objectivity, 
and objectivity-comprising the linear structures of Being and the 
relational ones of Essence-as the genesis or coming to be of the Concept 
(WLZ 213-14/SL 577). It seems to be a malter of Lhe addition of 
significance to what there is. Since the whole of objectivity, organized 
and coordinated as totality, is substance, and substance as social is a 
matter of lawful interaction or necessity, the Concept is also defined 
as the point of transition between necessity and freedom. "Thus the 
Concept is the truth of substance, and since substance has necessity for 
its specific mode of relation, freedom reveals itself as the truth of necessity 
and as the mode of relation proper to the Concept" ( WLZ 214/ SL 577-78) . 
Hegel's Concept carries connotations of selfhood, individuality, sub­
jectivity, and sociality that Fichte's wooden notion of lawful ordering 
did not admit. But another note in Hegel's defini6on of the Concept 
that is .closer to Fichte's is that it is a comntutation between the 
phenomenal "freedom" of appearing/acting and the necessity of 
positedness or facticity ( Gesetztsein). Substance, explains Hegel, returns 
to itself in and out of its positedness, realizes its causality as appearance 
or the play of reflection, thus perfects and completes itself as substance 
and goes over into freedom (WLZ214-l6/SL578-80). ''This completion 
is no longer substance itself, but something higher, the Concept, the 
subject'' ( WLZ 216/ SL 580). At this point where thought grasps itself as 
an organism or social substance whose causal power passes over into 
freedom and sn~jectivity, Hegel seems to surpass the empirical limits 
of Fichte's understanding of understanding. The Concept is the logical 
aspect of the Absolute, or is pure thought in on its way to self­
comprehension as absolute Idea. Those are Hegel's words, literally 
construed. How are we to understand and evaluate the emptiness of 
Fichte's thought over against its asserted substantiality in Hegel? 
One is perhaps in danger at this poim of being beguiled by some of 
Hegel's most sweeping, grand, and affect-laden language. Who or what 
it is that thinks the absolute Idea? Is it my personal I? Or is it the 
human community, the collectivity of language-users, laborers, and 
culture-mediated biologies? O:r is it some spirit or thing beyond? Positive· 
answers to all these questions must be ruled out, not just by the will 
not to see Hegel as a relapsed dogmatic, but by the text of The Science 
of Logfr itself. 
The Concept at which Hegel arrives in the culmination of thought's 
odyssey is "thought thinking itself' in a paradoxically abstract and con­
crete way. 18 It is logical thought, and so has an abstract universality suited 
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to diverse but unspecified real modes of thought; this abstract univer­
sality corresponds to rhe "formality" claimed by conventional logic. The 
Concept is concrete thought not because it is about detached episodes of 
finite experience or so-called concreta, but because it has elaborated 
its own determinacy to the point where diKerentiae integrate themselves 
into one another without exclusion o r opposition, as do the related 
species within a natural kind and the unrelated species within a 
functioning ecology. It is about itself in a way both self-refermtial and 
empty of real contents (physica l, psychic, or social), because it is logi­
cally reflective, or a meditation on method. AU these marks, that it is 
logical, concrete, and self-referential thinking, fall on the side of thought's 
form, namely, that i t is thinking or thinking of X, not on the side of 
thought's content-e.g., that it is thought of nature, o r finite spirit, or 
spirit as I, or spirit as political community, or spirit as the object of art 
and religion. 
What content Hegel chooses to give to thought in the unfolding of 
the purely logical life of the absolute Idea is terrestrial rather than 
extra-terrestrial. Thought's power is absolute and its domain is the 
infinite, but in The Logi.c itself philosophical thinking works itself beyond 
the (logically an<l his torically prior) fallacious concrctization of the 
infinite as a "beyond'' or "oLherside" of the finite. The culmination of 
Hegel's logic shows thought returned to itself infinite in its finite forms. 
The coment of the Logic's concluding section, "Th e Concept," is­
once Hegel gets beyond a tedious reworking of the materials of common 
logic, a fancy that Fichte too indulges- (}) a review of the methodol­
ogies of natural, social, and human sciences (mechanism, chemism, 
teleology) under the name of "Objectivity," (2) an overview of human 
cognition in its double appearance as the knowing su~ject and as the 
pull of normative ideas upon her, and finally (3) a methodological 
self-reflection about The l.ogi,c itself. This last is a return to the initial 
essay on the possibility of a beginning, on the equivalence of result 
and starting-poinl, and the uJtimale convertibility of immediacy and 
mediation. There is no flying beyond the ambit of possible experience 
or humanly imerpretable meaning, no flight from lhe life world, despite 
Platonic language and honorific words from the tradition such as tPleology 
and idea. The doctrine of the Concept in the Science of Logic is as little 
transcendent in its contents as Kant's "Doctrine of Method" is meta­
physical in the conclusion of The Critique of P1.1.r1> Reason. Conceptuality 
is an emergent phenomenon, supervenient on nothing's infection of 
being, necessity's nauowing of freedom, and on a society's and a culture's 
destining of the brief lives of its members. The freedom and subjectiv­
ity of the Concept arc another version of the fatality of t.he whole. 
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CONCLUSION : THE fJNITUDE OF THOUGHT 
Hegel 's Logic i in the end just a poignant a meditation on human 
limitation as is Fichte's. Fichte se ms to wax metaphy ical when h 
postulates the components of the syn thesis of consciousness (expres­
sion, image, knowing, thought, etc.) whose analysis is the prop r task 
of Wissenschaftslehre. At the periphery of what can Jegi imately be philo­
sophically explained, his l nguage becomes the logi al-that reas n 
can only dictate the schemata of spa 'e and time while experience must 
supply facti al determination is an interesting interpretation of the 
doctrine of the Incarnation-but Fichte 1s properly philosophical in­
t rest is lhe explanatory reconstruction of the facts of experiential con­
sdousn s. Much the same might be aid for Hegel. Like contemporary 
postmetaphysical philosophers. each enacts thought out of a background 
tradi lion of grand r claims than can b sustained and loftier language 
than an be deciphered. Both thinker finally resign themselves, I be­
lieve, to a world empty of theological consolations and to a prnxis of 
postmetaphysica l attempts t become beuer adju ted to finite life, un­
certain action, and cognition lacking any, save social, guarantees. That 
philosoph need still pr crib such therapeutic regimes for themselves 
today as Fichte and H g l did in 1812 testifies against the myth of 
progress. What is truly admi, ble and conceptually graceful in the nine­
teenth c ntury think rs is lhat they so adroitly used the resources ch 
tradition s metaphysical and theological languages t stimulate the intel­
lect's quest for wholeness and ompletion while simultaneously disso­
ciating the satisfaction of Lhat taste from world-denying pseudo-objects. 
NOTES 
l. G. W. F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik Erster Teil, ed. Georg Lassan, (Ham­
burg: Meiner Verlag, .1967). Hereafter cited WLE. Hegel 's cience of Logic, 
crans. A. V. Miller (Atlantic Highlands, NJ.: Humanitie Press, 19 9). 
Hereafter SL. 
Fo a bri f dis ussion of the difference between Lh first dition of 
Wisse-nschaft d~r Logik (1812: "Obje tive Logic," Book I; 1813: "Objeclive 
Logic , Book rI; 1816: ' Subjective L gic") and the second edition of the 
first book, "Die Lehre vom Sein" (18 2), se Giacomo Rin ldi, A History 
wuf. hiter-pretntion of the logic of Hege4 (Lewiston, N.Y.: Mellen, 1 92) 105-07. 
F r the purpos of discussion, an positions and arguments found in 
the Srience of Logic will be treated views Heg I held in 1812 the publi-
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cation date of "The Doctrine o f Being ." All translations which appear in 
this paper are mine. George di Giovan:ni , Jeffery Kinlaw, and Gfmter Zoeller 
s~1pplied he lpful comments o n an ealrlier· d raft of this paper. 
2. Uber das Verhaltniss der Logik zttr Philosoiphie oder Tra11-su:ndental 1.og;il< in Johann 
Gottlieb Fichtl''s nachgelassene Werke. ed. I .. H . Fichte, Vol. J (Berlin: de Gruhter, 
1962) . Cited hereafter as TL. 
3. Bardili offered a naturalistic or evolutio nary view of logic, which located 
coexistence, affinity, opposition, unity, order, and above all, identity in 
natllral beings given in presentation . Thought inverts their order, e .g., 
changing the natural order of impulse, actuality, possibility into the logical 
order of possibi1ity, actnality, impullse. Re inhold a ba ndoned the tra ns­
cendental stance late in 1799 for this new realism. See "BardUi an Reirihold, 
1 January 1800" in C. G. Bardili & C. L. Reinhold, Briefwechsrl iibe,· das 
Wesen der PhilosophiP. 1.md das linwesen ,der Spekulation (Miinchen: J. Len mer, 
1804) , 14-16, 32, 44-5. 
4. Hegel is able to defend himself against the tone, but not the suhstance, 
of the objection that systematic philosophy is finally a literary or ideological 
productio n . His basic question, first ;rnnounced in the Earliest German Sys­
tem Program, is: How must the world lbe in order to support the exis1ence 
of a free being? His philosophy "sho ws" that both the world-process and 
che reality acldressed in the Logic is thought, that the two are in congruence 
as totalities. These claims are normati"e, not factual. The fact that Hegelian 
thought is more agile than other phillosophcrs have conceived tho ught lo 
be, thus apparemly able to think throu.gh even the contradiction of freedo m 
and necessity, does not undo the precarious anthroporentrism of thought's 
narcissistic self-presupposing. 
Fichte's idealism makes the same m o ve , but its omological commitment 
to the ingredience of thought in reality is made in the more modesl Kantian 
language of appeal lo rules, or to lawfulness in general as a metaphysical 
foundation. Fichte claims for Wi.ssen.schaftslehrf''S thought a preeminence 
over sensible intuition in lhar perception merely is and reproduces an 
image of being's original appea-rance•, while philosophy understands t hat 
image as a consequence ofa rule (TL .396). "Hence we have comprehended 
and understood the empirical do main in its inmost essence and its true 
significance when we see iL produced from its laws. No mere empirical 
philosophy can do this. It has o nly the ima ge; we have it (derived] from 
its laws, and so with its meaning" (TL 393). 
5. See Sche lling 's tre atment of WL in .Zu.r Geschichte tfer newrren Philo,·ophie: 
Mii:nchnur Vorv.sungen, in &hellings Wenke (Munich: Beck, 1965) 10: 126-152. 
At one point SchelHng comments tha1 the most Hegel could have done is 
to show that the Idea is tbe nega tive of real existence. the necessary con­
ditio n without which noth ing could exist. From this, Lhough, it does not 
follow that anything exists. 'Tbe whole world lies as it were within the 
nets of intellect or reason, but t.he que stion is this : How has it com e 
within those nets? For there is evidently something other and som ething 
more in the world than mere reaso n, indee d somelhing straining against 
these boundaries" (SW 10: 143-44) . 
6. In a relatively lucid summary passage, Fichte d escribes his project : 
We are looking for the role thinkin:g plays in the primordial knowing, 
and we have pursued this 1.ask back to the formula: Appearance must 
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view 'itself as the viewing agelnt ( das 8ehende) absoluitely .. .. It nmst 
view iueff a& the viewer. ( TL '.2·62). 
Upon further analysis, Fi:chte ,co•nc.Judes there are two seeings or 1/iewiugs 
ingredient in appearance, one necessitated, one free. Th,e fir.st is intuition, 
1the .second thought:. 
7. J. G. Fic:l:1,te, Gesa:mta,u:sgabe der Bayerischen /\kademie de1r Wissenschaften, -ed. 
R. Lauth ,& H . GHwitzsky. IV. Kolfognachschriften, 2 (Stuttgart: fr,ommann­
Holi:boo.g, 1978) 48-49. 
The same d-ynamic character of ithe being~imag-e relation is insl:an.ced 
ag.a-i:n in the same work in Fichte's discussion of how space c-omes to he 
within intuition as the schema or ratLonal imag,e of the l's activiity. It is 
detennined by the laws of :reas:c,)n and displays activity as pu.re agi«.iity,, the 
.infinite exten.s'. _ line i.n every cliirecti-on.ion of the , or empty space (GA lV. 
2: WO- H11 :1. 
For· ain mum~nating discussi:on of how reflecting reneaion roediiates be­
tween life and nounfe, inner and outer, and constitutes (he very center 
of all knowing see Ei?ile-itumgsvorlesungen in die Wisse,:ischaftslehre (1813) i:n 
fiichte's nadvg1:lt1sse111: Werke, ed, l. H . Fkh:te <Bonn; Ma1n.1.s, 1834} l: 45-51. 
8 . See TL 213, where Fichte ,explains thait in the genetic or phH:o:soph.it:al 
account of appearance, .t'he 1 appears latJe ,on th,e sn:ne, havii,Jg as 
predecessors or components the -intuhive i1mage (which reflects the factua.l 
situation) and the intdlection or the thought t.fu.ereof. "The first image, 
re,tei\'ed into the seccmd., ex.pre:sses itseU: •.r posit 1nyse,lf absolutely.'"­
This passa:ge is (m,e of the .few in the Tw·ns.zendentale Logik where the l nl4 
.language of I, not-I, and pos.iting occurs. S-ee also TL 234 .. 
'9. Spinoza did hold that there is a formal s-ort of awaneness of awairenes.s or 
reflectivity that goes a)ong with .an.y knowledge, hut this seems 
propositional-"lf p, then 1 know that p, etc.''-a,nd not a matter pf knowing 
what .mind or idea itr; see Ethics 2, :21. [de.a :i~ idea of body, !bodies are 
composed of matte1r,; maue,r is unknowable . .Hen-c.e Jhe idea of any 
modification of body does not lbirin.g whh it foll knowledge of th..e body 
( Ethics 2, 27), nor does the idea of th.is modi fication of the human body 
involve adequate knowledge of the hum:au m.iud (Ethics 2., 29). 
10. l n la:ier version:s o f the Wissenschaftslehre, the irnag-e ,relation between bein,g 
an<l knowing is ex.presse<l in theologicail, mof'e specific.ally Christologkal 
terms, as in this passage from Vie Wisse:tl'sdtn:ftslehre in .i.h:rem aitge,nwii,,e:1:1 
Umrisse ( 1810)·: 
Now if 1here were lo be knowing, without it lbeiug G(}d h .imse:Jf. it 
:could m~ly be Goe! himsdf, slinc_e ther-e, is rwthi.~g nthe~ thc1;n G~r~, 
hut ou1ts1de God hunself; the b.e1ng of God 011ts1de of hts bemg; )us 
m.<toifestatio~t, hi w.hich he :is wholly what he is, .-if7!d yet in h-imsdf 
mm.aim wholly what he is. But such a manifestation is an image or 
schema. (Siin11lfrhe 'Wetke. ed. 1[. H. Fichte (Berlin: 1-845) 2: 696). 
'The being-+m.age ,.conuast in Fichte's later metaphysics its similar rn ithe 
We.fen-form d1stinctim11 Sch,elli,ng employs in b.iis jdentity ph:ilosnpby: see 
Bruno in .Sche.Uings We:rke 4: 2.38-39. Hegel bri mand)' dispby~ the com­
plete formality .tiild fh,idity of such category -distinctiions in hiis chapiter on 
.. AbsohHc Ground,'' Wissemr:ha/J d-er LCJgik, Zwe.it.er Tei/ (Hamburg: Mei.ner, 
J96.6) 66-76; hercafiter ci.t-ed as Wl~Z, 
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11. Hegel expresses lhis insigh t more gracefully in the Preface added for the 
second edition in 183l. In the common anthropological situation,· hu­
mans feel that they are their fedings, that their d esires and aspirations 
are their lives, but Lhat they ente1r the realm of abstract thought only with 
great difficulty and under compulsion . When one comes to appreciate 
the universality and freedom which i.s only in thought, c.>ne encou11ters 
Lhe difficult but true thought that finite consciousness is "had" or sup­
ported by thinking and universality. Ego is adjectival to thought, and is 
the active universal only because the universal power of thought pervades 
all ( WLE 14-15/ SL 35). 
Fichte is no friend of individual or idiosyncrntic subjectivity either. It is 
the skeptic who prizes her idiosyncratic self and elevates her observations 
into generalizations. fn the humble thinker, individuality is sacrificed, of 
fered up to the eternal, "but not i1n so far as this appears in another (which 
really is not even possible) but because it appears in himself" (TL 231) . 
12. Fichte's ontologica1 commitments are clear in the 1812 lectures. There 
arc two forms o f being: true being, which is absolutely self-contained and 
selr-determined, and relative being, which is nothing other than relation, 
connection, negatio1i ( TL 206-07). They are related as reality and appear­
ance. All the steps of the g,enctic deduction in the WissenschaflslehrR belong 
to the latter, for they are all pure i1mage. and pertain to the general domain 
of Erscheimmg which they explain . Images and philosophical explanations 
thereof presuppose some b eing or reality that they are about, but they 
are empty images of this being; they have the being of analyses or conreptual 
contrasts ( Tl 205) . To confuse absolute and relative being, or reality and 
appearance is as deplorable a mistake as confusing one's feet with the 
relation "large or small" one use.s to describe them. 
13. Sense in general and the five specific senses and their o bjects illustrate 
this structure. Along with the image of a sensible quality comes a general 
image of the sense, and, within o ne specific sense, say that of sight. one 
is aware of red only as contrasted with other determinate ways of chopping 
up the general determinability or color affects ( TL 242). Spinoza was the 
first to point o ut that awareness of x entails awareness of awareness of x. 
14. Hegel explains there is a twofold sense in which philosophy faces "the 
proble m of lhe beginning," one being the search for the p rinciple, the 
universal governing the facts of a domain. the other the search for a 
psychological ground of certainty in the methods, procedures. and re­
sults of a cognitive discipline. The first is the concern of the ancients in 
their struggle to grasp and formulate Lhc arc/ti or archai of a science. The 
latter is a peculiarly modern corncem. the uncertain spawn of Cartesian 
foundationalism and its bastard sibling. metaphysical skepticism. Both 
problems can be resolved simullLaneously if and only if what is first in 
thought is also first for thought ( WLE 51-52/ SL 67) . 
Hegel seems to make the famiJitar stipulation that what assuredly counts 
as knowledge must be belief which is both true and justilied, i.e .• certain 
or held with adequate warrant. The Phtmomrnology may be see n as a labo• 
rious educative project wherein lthe subject, the soul packed with preju· 
dices or unquestionE"d presuppositions, is brought to evidential adequacy 
so that, in the end, it is Anally suited to be introduced to trnlh or a bso­
lute content, i.e., it is ready to begin to think.. Set> WLE 30/ SL 49. 
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15. Both Schelling and Hegel, from the earliest days of identity philosophy, 
held the comple mentary convictions that there was one and only one Phi­
losophy, not plural philosophies contrived by idiosyncratic individual think­
ers, and that the sine qua non for thinking or moving in that one philosophy 
was the sacrifice of subjectivity in the sense of merely personal or idiosyn­
cratic points of view. See F. W. J. Schelling, Fernere Darstellu,ngen aus de1n 
System der Philosaphie ( 1802) in Schellings Werke4: 351-52 and G. W. F. Hegel , 
The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy, trans. H. S. 
Harris and Walter Cerf (Albany: SUNY Press, 1977) 88-89. Says Hegel 
there: "The essence of philosophy .. . is a bottomless abyss for personal 
idiosyncrasy. In order to reach philosophy it is necessary to throw oneself 
into it a rorps perd~t-meaning by body here the sum of one's idiosyncracies." 
16. The unfolding of the three fonns of Hegel's syllogism (formal, reflective, 
and necessary) progressively universalizes the connective function of the 
middle term so that it is simultaneously a unifying and a totalizing of 
different determinations. The upshot is that the Concept is realized and 
objectified, delivered from a formal mode of being to a substantial one. 
( WLZ 351-52/ SL 703). The syllogism is mediation, the complete Concept 
in its being posited. Its movement is the abolition of this mediation, in 
which nothing is in and for itself, but each term is only by means of 
another. Hence the result is an fo1mediacy which has emerged from the 
abolition of mediation .. . This being is therefore a complex {Sacltel that is 
in and for itself-objectivity ( WLZ 352/ SL 704). See also the treatment of 
syllogism undt-i- the title of method, WLZ 497-99/ SL 836-38. 
17. In a strange passage Fichte argues from a qualitative structure common 
to both sensibility and morality, viz., that each is determined from without, 
to the idea that the source of both is the Absolute, and that, accordingly. 
"in the fonn of mere sensibility we have the formal image IBildforml of 
morality, in that both have in common that they are absolutely qualitatively 
determined expressions IBilderl which appearance carries with it in its 
very being" ( TL 307). Everything that appears for consciousness does so 
within the unfolding flow of appearance, yet the sensory and intellectual 
contents, the factical this is and the intelligible that ought not be, are, both 
of them, definite and unyielding. 
18. The soltaion I offer to the charge that Hegel reifies and individualizes 
thinking as a subjfcl answers the problem within the confines of the Science 
of Logic. It. does not address the problem of the transition between logic 
and philosophy of nature, or of tbe Concept that in its complete freedom 
liberates itself into tht- real a1terity of nature and completes its liberation 
by coming to itself as subject ( M..Z 505-06/ SL 843-44). When the Concept 
is subject.ified in this manner it seems ripe for the theological metaphors 
(if they are metaphors) which 1ink the parts of the system in the Enz.yklopiidie 
der philo.sophischen Wissensc/iajten and which Schelling early on attacked at 
the weakest point of the system . ':Jacobi could hardly make something 
more vile of nature than Hegel made of it in contrast to the logical, from 
which he excluded it and to which he can still do nothing other than 
oppose it. There is in the Idea utterly no necessity for such a movement, 
no reason in itself for some further progression; it simply must wrench 
itself away from itself" (Schellings Werke 10: 152) . 
